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India's Fertiliser Import Bill Hits $18 Billion, and Parliament's Own Committee Explains Why

August 08, 2026

Fertiliser imports are set to surge 76% in a single fiscal year to a record $18 billion. A Parliamentary Standing Committee report, tabled the same month, explains the mechanism in one line: 90% of urea's cost is natural gas, and India sources only a quarter of that gas domestically. This is the fertiliser side of a story an earlier piece on this blog already priced from the gas side.

Agriculture · Trade · Energy

India's Fertiliser Import Bill Hits $18 Billion, and Parliament's Own Committee Explains Why

What the Standing Committee found Standing Committee on Chemicals & Fertilisers, report tabled 1 Dec 2025 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Urea cost that is natural gas 90% ...of which sourced domestically 26% Phosphate import dependence 95% Potash import dependence 100% Result: India's fertiliser import bill is projected to hit a record $18 billion this fiscal year — a 76% jump from the year before.
What Parliament's own committee found: India's fertiliser cost structure runs on imported inputs, from urea's gas bill to potash's near-total import dependence.
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Published · v1.0.0 · Standing Committee on Chemicals and Fertilisers report, 1 December 2025 (PRS Legislative Research summary) · Business Standard, January 2026

An Indian farmer spreading fertilizer over a crop in Andhra Pradesh
A farmer applying fertiliser in Andhra Pradesh — the end use of the imported urea, phosphate and potash behind India's $18 billion bill. An Indian farmer spreading fertilizer over a crop, kiran kumar, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons.
$18bnProjected fertiliser import bill this fiscal year — a record
76%Year-on-year increase in the import bill
90%Share of urea's production cost that is natural gas
26%Share of that natural gas India sources domestically

The number, and why it jumped

Not a one-off spike. A rains-driven demand surge on top of a structural import dependence.

India's fertiliser import bill is projected to hit a record $18 billion this fiscal year, a 76% jump from the year before, according to government and industry officials cited in January 2026 reporting. The proximate cause was weather, not policy: heavy rains prompted farmers to expand the area under cultivation, pushing up fertiliser consumption faster than domestic production could follow. The two products doing the most damage to the import bill are urea and DAP (di-ammonium phosphate), sourced mainly from Oman, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

What Parliament's own committee says the real problem is

Not a bad year. A structural dependence the committee has now put a number on.

The Standing Committee on Chemicals and Fertilisers, chaired by Azad Kirti Jha, tabled a report on 1 December 2025 titled “Self-Sufficiency in Production of Fertilisers with a View to Curb Import of Fertilisers — Review of Constraints thereof.” Its central finding connects directly to a fuel an earlier piece already priced: 90% of the total cost of producing urea is natural gas, procured largely through long-term import agreements — and only 26% of that gas is sourced domestically. The committee recommended reworking India's gas procurement mechanism to secure constant supply at competitive prices, and expediting domestic gas extraction to cut both import dependence and production cost.

Exhibit 1

What the Standing Committee found

Standing Committee on Chemicals and Fertilisers, report tabled 1 December 2025.

FindingFigure, %
Share of urea's production cost that is natural gas90
Share of that gas sourced domestically26
India's import dependence for phosphate requirements95
India's import dependence for potash requirements100

PRS Legislative Research, Report Summary: “Self-Sufficiency in Production of Fertilisers with a View to Curb Import of Fertilisers — Review of Constraints thereof,” summarising the Standing Committee on Chemicals and Fertilisers report of 1 December 2025.

Potash is the starkest line in that table: India imports 100% of its potash, and the reason is more precisely a mining-capacity gap than a pure geological one. India has no commercially exploited potash mine, but it is not reserve-free: the Geological Survey of India has estimated roughly 20,000 million tonnes of probable and possible potash reserves in the Nagaur-Ganganagar basin spanning parts of Rajasthan (Hanumangarh, Bikaner and neighbouring districts). Those deposits remain undeveloped, so in practice the 100% import figure holds today regardless of what sits underground. Concretely, that means importing roughly 40 lakh tonnes (about 4 million tonnes) of Muriate of Potash (MOP) a year, sourced mainly from Canada (through the Canpotex marketing consortium), Belarus, Israel, Jordan and Russia — a supplier list with real geopolitical concentration risk, given Belarus and Russia's own sanctions exposure and Canpotex's effective control of a large share of the world's seaborne potash trade. Phosphate at 95% import-dependence is closer to a solvable problem — the committee's recommendation is long-term supply agreements and joint ventures with raw-material-rich countries, plus faster completion of projects already underway to expand domestic phosphatic and potassic (P&K) capacity. The aging-plant finding adds a capacity-replacement problem on top of the raw-material one: 27 of 33 operational urea plants are more than a quarter-century old, and the committee flagged that the sector needs a technology transition within five years, recommending a dedicated task force for upgrading, modernising and reviving them.

The gas link, priced

This is the fertiliser-side half of an argument an earlier piece already made from the gas side.

Where this connects. An earlier piece on thermal parity established that India's domestic natural gas price is set monthly at 10% of the Indian crude oil basket, currently notified at $7.86/MMBtu against roughly $85/bbl crude — a policy-enforced link to oil prices, not a market-discovered gas price. The Standing Committee's 90%-of-urea-cost figure is the other end of that same pipe: whatever India's gas price does, urea's production cost moves with it almost one-for-one, and only a quarter of the gas behind that cost is domestically sourced rather than imported at whatever the global market or long-term contract price happens to be. A crude price spike does not just raise India's fuel-retail bill, which an earlier piece already priced in detail — it raises the fertiliser subsidy bill through the exact same gas-price channel, on a product where import dependence for the other two major nutrients (phosphate, potash) is already 95–100%.

What the committee wants done about it

Six recommendations, none of them quick.

  • A task force to promote domestic urea production under the New Investment Policy, alongside fiscal and tax incentives for new phosphatic and potassic capacity.
  • Indigenous process technology — the committee flagged India's current dependence on foreign companies for licensing the technology used to build and run fertiliser plants as a strategic gap in its own right, separate from the raw-material dependence.
  • A modified gas procurement mechanism, to secure constant supply at competitive prices and reduce the subsidy's exposure to gas-price volatility — the same 90%-of-cost figure above is the reason this recommendation exists.
  • Long-term agreements and joint ventures with countries that hold the phosphate and potash reserves India lacks, plus faster completion of already-initiated P&K expansion projects.
  • Nano-fertiliser promotion, including a proposed Production Linked Incentive scheme specifically for drones used to spray nano-fertilisers — framed by the committee as a lower-raw-material-intensity substitute for conventional fertiliser at scale.
  • Anti-black-marketing measures — a network of quality-testing labs and a grievance-redressal mechanism, aimed at the diversion of subsidised fertiliser, which the committee treats as a fiscal leakage problem as much as a farmer-protection one.
What this article does not establish. Whether the $18 billion import figure and 76% year-on-year increase have been confirmed in an official government release beyond the officials quoted in January 2026 press reporting — this article could not independently locate a PIB or Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers statement with the same figure. Two sources referenced in the underlying research notebook — on Russia's position as a fertiliser supplier to India, and on China's specialty-fertiliser export curbs — could not be retrieved by this article (access blocked) and are not used here; readers researching supplier-country risk should treat that as an open gap, not a settled picture. Whether any of the Standing Committee's six recommendations have been formally accepted or budgeted by the government is not addressed here — a committee report is a recommendation, not an implemented policy.

Sources. Record fertiliser import bill ($18 billion, +76% YoY) and import sourcing (Oman, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Morocco) — Business Standard, “Fertiliser imports set for record $18 billion this fiscal year: Officials,” January 2026. Standing Committee on Chemicals and Fertilisers findings and recommendations — PRS Legislative Research, Report Summary on the Committee's report of 1 December 2025 (Chair: Azad Kirti Jha), prsindia.org. MOP import volume (~40 lakh tonnes/year), supplier countries (Canada via Canpotex, Belarus, Israel, Jordan, Russia) and India's undeveloped Rajasthan potash reserves (GSI estimate, ~20,000 million tonnes probable/possible) — compiled from Volza trade-data summaries, PIB coverage of the Canpotex MOU, and Takshashila Institution's fertiliser-geopolitics brief; this article could not independently verify the 40-lakh-tonne figure against a single primary customs or Department of Fertilizers dataset, so it is reported as a widely cited industry estimate rather than an official statistic. India's domestic gas pricing and its crude-oil linkage — this blog's own thermal parity article, sourced to PPAC's live gas price notifications. This article's fertiliser-import figures were not independently cross-checked against a PIB or ministry press release; where a claim rests on a single news source rather than a primary government document, that is noted in the text.

About this article: Researched, written and edited by Umashankar Triplicane Dwarakanathan, with AI research assistance; every figure is meant to trace to the primary source cited. See the Editorial Policy for how sourcing, AI use and corrections work.

Umashankar Triplicane Dwarakanathan
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Umashankar Triplicane Dwarakanathan
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